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AN APPEAL TO EQUITY: WHY BANKRUPTCY COURTS
SHOULD RESORT TO EQUITABLE POWERS FOR LATITUDE
IN THEIR INTERPRETATION OF "INTERESTS" UNDER
SECTION 363(f) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION
The last several years have witnessed a markedly high number
of corporate bankruptcy proceedings, including many high profile
petitioners such as Enron, Adelphia Communications, WorldCom
and Global Crossing.' Record numbers of public corporate bankrupt-
cies were set in 2001 and again in 2002; during this time, 191 such
companies filed for bankruptcy protection.2 The bankruptcy process
often involves the sale of corporate assets to raise money for
creditors of the business, and the Bankruptcy Code3 offers two
means by which a debtor or trustee may sell business assets:
sections 363(b) and (f),4 which govern sales prior to approval of a
reorganization plan, and sections 1123(a)(5)(D)5 and 1141(c),6 which
govern sales made pursuant to a reorganization plan. Debtors and
trustees most often prefer a pre-plan sale under § 363 because in
comparison to sales pursuant to a reorganization plan, pre-plan
sales impose the Bankruptcy Code's minimum notice and hearing
requirements and, .accordingly, are usually quicker and less
expensive.7
1. Susan O'Connell & Jeffrey R. Bourassa, Bankruptcy: Does Your Legal Team Include
a Forensic Accountant?, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38 (Apr. 2003).
2. Id.
3. The Bankruptcy Code is codified in Title 11 of the U.S. Code.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2000).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (2000).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2000).
7. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125 (postpetition disclosure and solicitation), 1126 (acceptance of
plan), 1128 (confirmation hearing) (2000); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002, 9006, 9007 (notice rules).
Under a sale pursuant to a reorganization plan, all parties in interest must have twenty-five
days' notice of a hearing covering the disclosure statement. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(b).
Compiling and circulating the disclosure statement and reorganization plan, distributing and
collecting ballots, and conducting hearings for the disclosure statement and plan confirmation
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Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism by
which a debtor's assets may be sold "free and clear of any interest
in such property."8 Such a "free and clear" pre-plan sale under §
363(f) not only saves time and money in terms of decreased notice
and hearing requirements when compared to a sale pursuant to a
reorganization plan,9 but it also provides a valuable means to raise
funds for the debtor because a purchaser of bankruptcy assets will
pay more for the assets when they are sold without the risk of
successor liability.' ° Accordingly, the purchaser, debtor, creditors,
and general public are beneficiaries of the "free and clear" sale
process under § 363(f). There has been ample debate, however, with
respect to what constitutes an "interest" within the meaning of
§ 363(f). 11
It has been argued that bankruptcy courts and other courts have
adopted a far too expansive view of what falls within the definition
of an "interest" and have thereby impermissibly extinguished
certain claims that might otherwise be rightfully pursued against
the purchaser of the bankruptcy assets. 12 In contrast, others have
argued that successor liability in the context of § 363(f) amounts to
a regulatory taking in violation of the Takings Clause of the
Constitution and that "interest" should be construed broadly.13 Case
law has provided little guidance as to whether the narrow or
expansive interpretation of "interest" is more compelling. 4 A
require substantial time and money. A motion to sell assets under § 363, in contrast, may be
approved within twenty days or fewer and may be brought at any time after the bankruptcy
petition is filed. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000). A debtor achieves essentially the same result under
either a § 363(f) sale or a sale pursuant to a plan of reorganization.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000).
9. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10. The rational economic actor will require a discount on the purchase price of assets not
"free and clear" to account for the increased risk that the purchaser will face successor
liability in the future.
11. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and
Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 236-37 (2002) (arguing that
bankruptcy courts have not followed the plain meaning of § 363(f)).
13. See, e.g., William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Inequality Among Creditors: The
Unconstitutional Use of Successor Liability to Create a New Class of Priority Claimants, 4 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 325, 356-64 (1996) (arguing that successor liability is an
unconstitutional servitude on purchased property).
14. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.
(In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573, 581-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
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proponent of either side of the argument has little difficulty in
marshaling decisions supporting his particular view of what
interpretation is proper, and there is currently a marked split in the
bankruptcy courts and courts reviewing their decisions.15
The importance of determining whether an item falls within the
definition of "interest" according to § 363(o cannot be overempha-
sized. A specific court's interpretation of what constitutes an
"interest" can mean the difference between the termination of a
plaintiffs claim against a successor purchaser and unbounded
successor liability for the purchaser of the bankruptcy assets. As
sales pursuant to § 363(f) become more widespread as a means to
liquidate debtors' assets quickly and efficiently without having to
satisfy the extensive requirements of developing and implementing
a reorganization plan under other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code,' 6 the importance of resolving the uncertainty will grow
increasingly acute. Some courts have found certain liabilities to be
categorically unseverable from purchased assets. 7 Other courts
have allowed all liabilities to be severed from the debtor's assets,
regardless of character." Still other courts have permitted successor
liability in some circumstances while disallowing it in others by
finding subtle distinctions between facially similar cases. 9
obligations owed to benefit plans under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992
were interests that could be stripped by operation of § 363(f)). But see, e.g., Fairchild Aircraft
Inc. v. Campbell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 932-34 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995)
(holding that a § 363 sale order did not protect the purchaser of a commuter aircraft business
against products liability claims brought on behalf of persons injured after the sale from the
crash of aircraft made long before the sale), vacated by 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998).
For further commentary about In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., see Bruce H. White & William
L. Medford, Section 363 Sales: Let the Buyer Beware, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28 (July-Aug.
2002).
15. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. at 917-18.
18. See, e.g., Mich. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re Wolverine
Radio Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1145-50 (6th Cir. 1991).
19. See, e.g., ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928, 930-32 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that a party that purchases an intellectual property asset pursuant to a §
363(f) sale is protected against a third-party claim that the third party owns the asset). But
see, e.g., Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (criticizing the
notion that buyers in bankruptcy sales should be protected from all successor liability and
declining to hold that bankruptcy courts can preclude claims of successor liability as a means
to boost the proceeds from sale). 'To do so [would provide] an advantage that asset sellers do
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A recent Third Circuit decision, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Knox-Schillinger (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.),2
exemplifies the friction that plagues the interpretation of what
constitutes an "interest" under § 363(f). This Note utilizes that case
as an example for purposes of discussing the matter and for
recommending a case law-driven means to minimizing some of the
confusion in the interpretation and the application of § 363(f). Part I
supplies a contextual background to In re TWA. Part II discusses
§ 363(f) generally and identifies the problems of statutory construc-
tion that have led to the controversy in its interpretation. Part III
analyzes the reasoning of In re TWA, focusing particularly on the
Third Circuit's broad interpretation of "interest" in contravention of
the plain language of § 363(f). Part IV suggests that the result in In
re TWA, although beyond the scope of the plain language of § 363(f),
was based on the court's balancing of equitable circumstances
within the case and when read in that context, was the correct
result. Part IV contends further that bankruptcy courts and
reviewing courts ought to ground such equity balances within
preexisting equitable powers provided by the Bankruptcy Code
rather than in amorphous discussions of public policy. This Note
concludes that such an approach would do less violence to the plain
language of § 363(f) than the practice used by the In re TWA court
and those courts following similar approaches, while still maintain-
ing ample flexibility for courts to serve the overall interests of the
Bankruptcy Code.
I. PRELUDE TO A CONTROVERSY: THE PRE-PETITION SALE OF TWA
ASSETS TO AMERICAN AIRLINES
On January 10, 2001, Trans WorldAirlines (TWA) filed a Chapter
11 bankruptcy petition.2 The United States' eighth-largest airline
at the time, TWA had not earned a profit in more than ten years.22
In the spring of 2000, TWA determined that it could not continue to
not have outside the bankruptcy laws." Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
195 B.R. 716, 731 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996).
20. 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003).
21. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 980, at *5 (Bankr.
D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001).
22. In re TWA, 322 F.3d at 286.
[Vol. 47:347
AN APPEAL TO EQUITY
operate independently and the company subsequently sought to
enter a business combination-such as a merger with, or sale of
assets to-a competing airline. 23 Throughout 2000, TWA was
engaged in discussions with American Airlines regarding the
formation of a prospective strategic partnership.24
A week after proposing to purchase TWA's assets,25 American
Airlines agreed on January 9, 2001, "to a purchase plan subject to
an auction and bankruptcy court approval.",26 Although TWA's
assets were to be sold pursuant to a public bidding process, as of the
deadline for the submission of bids, only American Airlines had
offered an order-compliant bid.27 The Board of Directors of TWA
accepted American Airlines' proposal to purchase TWA's assets for
$742 million.2 "
American Airlines purchased TWA'sassets through a pre-petition
sale process in accordance with the terms of § 363(f) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code,29 which allows for assets in bankruptcy to be sold "free
and clear of any interest in such property" assuming certain
preconditions are met.30 Essentially, if the requirements of § 363(f)
are satisfied, the bankruptcy court has the authority to sever
"interests" from the assets so that the purchaser can take possession
of them without fear of successor liability for such "interests."
The interests at issue in the In re TWA case were travel vouchers
granted to TWA employees pursuant to the settlement of two class
action lawsuits.3' The first suit claimed that TWA's maternity leave
policy had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 The
second suit involved twenty-nine discrimination claims that had
been filed against TWA with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging violations of several federal employ-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 286-87.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000).
31. In re TWA, 322 F.3d at 285.
32. Id.
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ment discrimination statutes.33 In approving the sale order convey-
ing the assets of TWA to American Airlines, the bankruptcy court
determined that § 363(f) had been satisfied and that there was no
basis for successor liability attaching to American Airlines.34 The
United States District Court for the District of Delaware affirmed
the bankruptcy court's order extinguishing the claims.35 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequently affirmed
the district court's decision.36
The Third Circuit's opinion likely will face ample scholarly
criticism for its extremely broad interpretation of what constitutes
an "interest" within the meaning of § 363(f). 7 Before discussing why
the decision to strip the travel voucher and EEOC claims from
TWA's assets, thereby precluding such claims from being enforced
against American Airlines, will be subject to a high degree of
criticism, it is worthwhile to discuss § 363(f) in a general sense to
garner an overview of its basic doctrinal background.
II. SECTION 363(f): EXPEDIENT SALE MECHANISM OR A MEANS TO
CIRCUMVENT VALUABLE PROVISIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE?
The sale of assets under the authority of § 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code has become an increasingly important aspect of Chapter 11
filings. 3 The incidence of bankruptcy reorganizations has increased
33. Id. at 285-86 (noting alleged violations of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
34. Id. at 286. The order provided that
the free and clear delivery of the Assets shall include, but not be limited to, all
asserted or unasserted, known or unknown, employment related claims, payroll
taxes, employee contracts, employee seniority accrued while employed with any
of the Sellers and successorship liability accrued up to the date of closing of such
sale.
Id. at 286-87.
35. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. TWA, Inc. (In re TWA, Inc.), No. 01-0022
& 01-0026, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25126, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 11, 2001).
36. In re TWA, 322 F.3d at 293.
37. See generally Kuney, supra note 12, at 236-37 (contending that courts have interpreted
"interest" too broadly to include "claims" from general unsecured claimants).
38. See id. at 242-43 (stating that the use of § 363(f) "has led to the rough-and-ready
practice of ... throwing companies into bankruptcy merely to effect an asset sale of a business
or division"); see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56
STAN. L. REv. 673 (2003) (arguing that the use of Chapter 11 to force asset sales has eclipsed
the original purpose of Chapter 11); Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in
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in the past several years in the wake of the September 11
terrorist attacks39 and much ballyhooed corporate governance
scandals4" including-among others-Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia
Communications, and Global Crossing.41 The costs associated with
the development of a reorganization plan and a disclosure statement
often push debtors in the direction of an asset sale as a means of
maximizing asset value and quickly satisfying outstanding debts.42
Pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, if the trustee is autho-
rized to operate the business of the debtor, the trustee may enter
into transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the
estate, and may use property of the estate, in the ordinary course of
business, unless the court has ordered otherwise.43 The trustee may
conduct these transactions without the same expansive notice and
hearing requirements that would otherwise be necessary in a
reorganization proceeding under Chapter 11.44
The express language of § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this
section free and clear of any interest in such property of an
entity other than the estate, only if-
Possession, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (Sept. 2003) (contending that Chapter 11 has become
a vehicle for secured creditors to force the sale of assets as if the process were a federal
judicial foreclosure proceeding rather than a reorganization).
39. See, e.g., Terry Maxon & Katie Fairbank, Analysts Foresee Better Days Ahead for
Travel, but Say More Shake-ups Likely, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Jan. 1, 2002, at C1 (noting
that bankruptcies within the tourism industry increased in the wake of the terrorist attacks).
40. Rep. Michael Oxley, Press Conference at the National Press Club Luncheon (Mar. 1,
2004) ("[I]n late 2001 and in 2002, we saw $7 trillion of market capitalization evaporate
seemingly overnight. We faced unexpected bankruptcy after unexpected bankruptcy without
knowing for sure how widespread the accounting and corporate governance problems really
were.").
41. See, e.g., O'Connell & Bourassa, supra note 1, at 38.
42. See Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 13, at 335; see also J. Vincent Aug et al., The Plan
of Reorganization: A Thing of the Past?, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3, 4-5 (2004) ("A Section 363
sale is generally the preferred method for selling assets because it is quicker and less
expensive, and provides a quick fix to address continuing losses, rapidly depleting assets, and
loss of cash flow.").
43. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1), (f) (2000).
44. Id.
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1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such
property free and clear of such interest;
[451
2) such entity consents;[46
3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of
all liens on such property;
471
4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such
interest.48
The controversy with respect to § 363(f) has focused on the
appropriate definition of "interest." The term "interest" is not
defined within the Bankruptcy Code; therein lies much of the
problem with judicial interpretation of § 363(f). The legislative
history is clear that a mortgage or U.C.C. lien against property may
45. This subsection essentially requires courts to look to state statutory or common law
principles of successor liability in an effort to determine whether such law would permit a
severance of successor liability from the property at issue. Although the intricacies of state
law successor liability could fill a treatise, only a cursory overview is necessary here.
Interested readers are directed to the cited cases for further study.
Traditional notions of corporate common law hold that a purchaser generally is not
responsible for the debts and liabilities of the selling entity. See, e.g., Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that "[w]hen no
statutory merger or consolidation occurs, but one corporation buys all of the assets of another,
the successor will not be saddled with the seller's liability except under certain conditions").
The rationale is that the debts and liabilities of the selling party do not attach to the assets,
but to the corporate structure. Most jurisdictions have created four exceptions to the general
"no liability" rule. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977). The
exceptions cover situations in which:
(1) The purchaser expressly or impliedly assumes the liabilities of the seller. See,
e.g., Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280, 1289 (8th Cir. 1983).
(2) The transaction constitutes a de facto merger or consolidation of the
purchaser and seller corporations. See, e.g., Leannais, 565 F.2d at 439.
(3) The successor is a mere continuation of the predecessor. See, e.g., Bud Antle,
Inc. v. E. Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1985).
(4) The transaction was entered into in an effort to avoid liabilities. See, e.g.,
Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868, 872-74 (D. Or. 1988).
46. There is obviously no need to preclude the "free and clear' sale when the party holding
the "interest" consents to its severance.
47. The use of the word "lien" is significant from a statutory language construction
standpoint as it connotes that the other portions of § 363(f) apply to items other than "liens."
This matter is discussed infra in text accompanying note 50.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000).
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be stripped under § 363(o.4" Section 363(f)(3) specifically discusses
"lien[s]."5° If, however, a specific portion of § 363(f) was meant only
to apply to "liens," it must be concluded that the remaining portions
of § 363(f) apply to "interests" other than liens, or, by implication,
"liens" are but one subset of "interests." The area at issue lies in
determining what falls within the parameters of an "interest" and
thus, what is properly strippable from bankruptcy assets pursuant
to a sale in accordance with § 363(f).
The importance of what constitutes an "interest" under § 363(f)
cannot be overemphasized. A specific court's interpretation of what
constitutes an "interest" can mean the difference between the
termination of a plaintiffs claim against a successor purchaser (thus
decreasing the overall asset pool from which the claim can be
satisfied) and unbounded successor liability of the purchaser of the
bankruptcy assets. That is, if a plaintiff's claim is held to be an
"interest" that is properly strippable by a bankruptcy court under §
363(f), the plaintiff may only assert his claim against the sale
proceeds. By contrast, if a plaintiffs claim is held to be outside the
scope of strippable "interests," he may assert his claim against the
purchaser of the bankruptcy assets under a theory of successor
liability.51
Despite the fact that § 363(f) speaks only of an "interest,"2 some
courts have routinely determined that it also may be used to strip
"claims."5 From a statutory construction standpoint, however, it
might be telling that the only provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
that specifically authorize the sale of assets "free and clear" of
"claims and interests" are § 1123(b)(4),54 which permits the sale of
49. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 345 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6301-02.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (2000).
51. See supra note 45.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000).
53. See, e.g., Paris Mfg. Corp. v. Ace Hardware Corp. (In re Paris Indus. Corp.), 132 B.R.
504, 507 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (finding that the "free and clear" sale provisions authorized the
court to enjoin product liability claims against the purchaser); Am. Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In
re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that product
liability claims were precluded by a § 363(f) sale), affd sub nom. Griffin v. Bonapfel (In re All
Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 805 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1986); Rubinstein v. Alaska Pac. Consortium
(In re New Eng. Fish Co.), 19 B.R. 323, 329 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (finding that the §
363(f) sale was free and clear of Title VII discrimination and civil rights claims of debtor's
employees).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2000).
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assets in the context of a plan, and § 1141(c),55 which allows
property to vest through a confirmed plan free and clear of "claims
and interests." That is, the argument goes, if the drafters of § 363(f)
had intended it to apply to "claims," they would have included
language within that provision identical to that used in other areas
of the Bankruptcy Code and, accordingly, the conspicuous absence
of "claims" should be given effect by courts in their interpretation of
§ 363(f).
Furthermore, although the Code fails to define "interest," it does
define the term "claim" in § 101 as
[a] right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; or [a] right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment,
whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, secured, or unsecured.56
Had Congress intended for § 363(f) to apply to "claims," it could
have used the pre-defined word "claim" in its formulation of that
section rather than the undefined term "interest." Again, by
implication, the absence of the word "claim" from the language of §
363(f) reflects a legislative intention to exclude "claims" from the
operation of that section.57
The appropriateness of the inclusion of "claims" within the
purview of § 363(f) has been hotly debated. Proponents of one side
of the argument emphatically believe that the inclusion of "claims"
is wrong; they note that because pre-plan sales transpire on a more
expedited basis and do not require extensive notice and multiple
hearings that are part of the plan confirmation process, the
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2000).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)-(B) (2000).
57. The author believes the latter argument (that the Code defines "claim" elsewhere) to
be the most compelling evidence that § 363(f) does not contemplate "claims." The former
rationale (that the Code uses the terms "claims" and "interests" together elsewhere in the
Code and, accordingly, such terms must be mutually exclusive) has been advanced by
scholars, but it is noteworthy to mention that the other Chapter 11 contexts in which "claims"
and "interests" appear together contemplate a means to distinguish the "interests" of equity
stakeholders and the "claims" of creditors.
356 [Vol. 47:347
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interests of some parties are subordinated inappropriately." Those
adopting this view argue that bankruptcy courts should return to a
plain language interpretation of § 363(f), which would effectively
require courts to narrow the scope of their interpretation of the
section generally, 59 but broaden it in the specific area of traditional
in rem property interests such as easements and covenants.6" The
foundation for this argument lies primarily upon the notion that to
disallow successor liability in the bankruptcy law is to provide some
benefit to asset purchasers that cannot be had outside the confines
of bankruptcy proceedings.61
Other authors, adopting a contrary position, contend that the
exclusion of claims from the operation of § 363(f) creates successor
liability exposure to purchasers of bankruptcy assets amounting to
a regulatory taking without compensation in violation of the
Takings Clause62 of the Constitution.63 Courts have failed to address
58. Kuney, supra note 12, at 272-86 (discussing the effect that inclusion of "claims" has
on various stakeholders). The rejoinder to Professor Kuney's view, although significantly
predating his article, was well stated by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Truck Drivers Union
(Independent) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48,50 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[fIt is desirable,
perhaps even necessary, to shield purchasers of failing businesses from liability incurred by
the predecessors. Such protection is viewed as a means of encouraging market growth and the
fluidity of corporate capital.").
59. Kuney, supra note 12, at 286-87.
60. George W. Kuney, Further Misinterpretation of Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f):
Elevating In Rem Interests and Promoting the Use of Property Law to Bankruptcy-Proof Real
Estate Developments, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289 (2002) (arguing that in rem land interests should
be interests that are stripped off under § 363(f)). To the extent that current judicial
approaches vary from the plain language of § 363(0 and categorically exclude reciprocal
easements and covenants from the operation of § 363(f) without resort to the equitable powers
provision discussed infra Part IV, the author of this Note agrees with Professor Kuney. Kuney
argues that bankruptcy courts are wont to ignore nonbankruptcy law mechanisms by which
easements and covenants can be removed and that, as such, the courts are inappropriately
failing to sever such "interests" pursuant to § 363(f)(1). Id. at 291.
61. See Kuney, supra note 12, at 235.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
63. See Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 13, at 356-64. Bodoh and Morgan fail to discuss that
the plain language of § 363(f) does not contain the word "claim." Kuney, supra note 12, at 258
n.91. Notwithstanding the omission, Bodoh and Morgan's overall rationale is compelling
because sales pursuant to § 363(f), on the whole, provide a valuable and expedient means to
liquidate debtor property. Although Bodoh and Morgan base much of their argument on
"impermissible judicial activism," it may be argued that a court's failure to follow plain
language would constitute similar "activist" conduct. See Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 13, at
353. For precisely this reason, this Note supports the broad operation of "free and clear" sales
based not on the language of § 363(f) exclusively, but when § 363(f) is bolstered by additional
equitable powers granted to courts elsewhere within the Bankruptcy Code. See infra Part IV.
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this constitutional takings issue, but it is also important to mention
that the takings analysis has a mirror image. That is, an inappro-
priate stripping of a claim through a § 363(f) sale could just as easily
be construed as a constitutionally violative taking from the claimant
who would otherwise seek to assert the claim.
6 4
What matters for purposes of the instant discussion is that
reasonable minds have disagreed on the appropriate scope of the
term "interest" under § 363(f). Case law in the area exemplifies the
manifestation of such disagreement in spades.65 Whatever a plain
language reading of § 363(f)'s "free and clear" language may
suggest,66 a review of the decisions in this area reveals that a
bankruptcy court's sales order pursuant to § 363(f) does not always
operate as a complete bar to the imposition of future liability even
in cases where the statutory language is directly quoted in the
judicial order.67 Some courts have found certain liabilities to be
categorically unseverable from the purchased assets.6" Other courts
have reached exactly the opposite result.69 Still other courts have
parsed the language so as to permit successor liability in some
64. A more thorough analysis of the countervailing takings arguments is beyond the scope
of this Note, but it is worthy to mention that the courts' failure to discuss the matter may well
lie in the conundrum that would result from the takings analysis: A court passing on the
takings issue would necessarily be addressing the "claim" as a potential taking of "property"
and to identify the claim as an interest in property would allow the use of § 363(f) to strip the
claim from the underlying property of the debtor. It would, of course, be this stripping of the
claim that would give rise to the claim that such action was a taking in the first place. See
supra note 13.
65. See United States Mine Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal
Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573, 581-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
obligations owed under a retirement benefit plan were interests that could be stripped by §
363(f)). But see Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Campbell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R.
910, 932-34 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that a § 363 sale order did not protect the
purchaser against products liability claims), vacated by 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998).
66. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716, 733-35
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that despite the purchaser's contentions that it purchased
the debtor's assets free and clear of all encumbrances, including environmental claims,
successor liability was applicable to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) claims and that successor liability was not discharged by the
debtor's bankruptcy sale).
68. See In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. at 917-18 (limiting § 363(f) to reaching only
traditional in rem interests).
69. See Mich. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re Wolverine Radio
Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1145-50 (6th Cir. 1991).
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circumstances, while disallowing it in others.7" Despite calls from
some legal scholars for a return to a narrow plain language
approach,71 bankruptcy treatises have noted that, generally, courts
have taken a decidedly contrary approach, favoring a more expan-
sive interpretation. 2 Courts have seized upon authorities pointing
in each direction and cited them as supporting authority for their
decisions. 3
It was in this environment that the Third Circuit decided In re
TWA, and it is within this same area of uncertainty that this Note
discusses the court's reasoning.
III. IN RE TWA: UNCONVINCING REASONING BREEDS CONVINCING
RESULTS
The appellants in In re TWA-the EEOC and the flight attendant
class in possession of the travel vouchers-made two principal
arguments regarding their claims.74 First, they contended that their
claims were "not interests in property within the meaning of [§
363(f)] and that, therefore, these claims were improperly extin-
guished by the Sale Order."75 Appellants further asserted that
"interests" within the meaning of § 363(f) were limited to "liens,
mortgages, money judgments, writs of garnishment and attachment,
70. See, e.g., ITOFCA, Inc. v. MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 322 F.3d 928, 930-32 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that a party that purchases an intellectual property asset pursuant to a §
363(f) sale is protected against a third-party claim, provided that the third party was on notice
of the proposed sale). But see, e.g., Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163-64 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a successor liability
suit against the purchaser of the debtor's assets because the plaintiffs opportunity to pursue
a legal remedy had been foreclosed by the debtor's liquidation).
71. See Kuney, supra note 12, at 237.
72. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 363.06[l] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
15th ed., rev. 2005).
73. See infra Part III.
74. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Knox-Schillinger (In re TWA, Inc.), 322
F.3d 283, 288 (3d Cir. 2003).
75. Id. Appellants also claimed that their claims were outside the scope of § 363(0(5)
because they could not be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
satisfaction of their interests. Id. American Airlines argued that appellants could be
compelled to accept a money satisfaction of their claims. Id. The court dispensed with this
portion of the appeal in a single paragraph and upheld the bankruptcy court's determination
that because the travel vouchers and EEOC claims were both subject to monetary valuation,
the condition of § 363(f)(5) had been satisfied. Id. at 290-91.
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and the like, and cannot encompass successor liability claims
arising under federal antidiscrimination statutes and judicial
decrees implementing those statutes. 76 Quite predictably, American
Airlines argued that "while Congress did not expressly define
'interest in property,' the phrase should be broadly read to authorize
a bankruptcy court to bar any interest that could potentially travel
with the property being sold, even if the asserted interest is unse-
cured."77
The Third Circuit began its analysis by canvassing precedent and
a treatise.7" Although it acknowledged that some courts have
narrowly interpreted "interests" to mean only in rem interests in
property such as liens,79 the court seized upon the language of the
treatise that states, in pertinent part, that "the trend seems to be
toward a more expansive reading of 'interests in property' which
'encompasses other obligations that may flow from ownership of the
property."'' 0
The court relied on two principal cases as the foundation for its
ultimate decision to adopt an expansive reading of the term "inter-
est." One of these decisions was another Third Circuit case, Folger
Adam Security Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, JV, in which the
court determined that a § 363(f) sale of the debtor's assets would not
extinguish certain affirmative defenses, such as setoff and recoup-
ment, to a breach of contract claim. 2 Although the Folger decision
actually limited the scope of § 363(f), the test adopted by the Third
Circuit in Folger for determining whether an item was characterized
properly as an "interest," that is, whether the obligations "are
76. Id. at 288.
77. Id. at 288-89.
78. Id. at 288.
79. Id. (citing Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White
Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)); Rubinstein v. Alaska Pac.
Consortium (In re New Eng. Fish Co.), 19 B.R. 323, 326 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982).
80. In re TWA, 322 F.3d at 289 (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 363.06[1]) (Alan N.
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2005); see also WBQ P'ship v. Virginia Dep't
of Med. Assistance Servs. (In re WBQ P'ship), 189 B.R. 97, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995)
(holding that Virginia's right to recover overpayments was an "interest"); Am. Living Sys. v.
Bonapfel (In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (precluding
plaintiffs from pursuing product liability claims against purchaser of bankruptcy assets).
81. 209 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2000).
82. Id. at 261.
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connected to, or arise from, the property being sold,"8 was the same
as that utilized by the court in the In re TWA decision."
The other case relied upon by the In re TWA court, United Mine
Workers ofAmerican 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.
(In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 5 was a Fourth Circuit decision
that the Third Circuit had used earlier in its Folger decision. 6 In
Leckie, the Fourth Circuit held that, irrespective of whether the
purchasers of the debtors' assets were successors in interest, under
§ 363(f), the bankruptcy court could properly extinguish all succes-
sor liability claims against the purchasers arising under the Coal
Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (Coal Act) by entering an order
transferring the debtors' assets free and clear of those claims.8 7 Two
employer-sponsored benefit plans that sought to collect Coal Act
premium payments from the asset purchasers were held to have
been asserting interests in property that had been terminated
through the § 363(f) sale process, and, accordingly, their successor
liability claims were not allowed to proceed. 8
The In re TWA court agreed with American Airlines' analogy
between the claims in Leckie and those in the instant matter:.
In each case it was the assets of the debtor which gave rise to
the claims. Had TWA not invested in airline assets, which
required the employment of the EEOC claimants, those succes-
sor liability claims would not have arisen. Furthermore, TWA's
investment in commercial aviation is inextricably linked to its
employment of the [flight attendant plaintiffs' class] as flight
attendants, and its ability to distribute travel vouchers as part
of the settlement agreement. While the interests of the EEOC
and the [flight attendant plaintiffs' class] in the assets of TWA's
bankruptcy estate are not interests in property in the sense that
they are not in rem interests ... they are interests in property
within the meaning of section 363(f) in the sense that they arise
from the property being sold.89
83. Id. at 259.
84. In re TWA, 322 F.3d at 290.
85. 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996).
86. Folger, 209 F.3d at 258-59.
87. Leckie, 99 F.3d at 585-87.
88. Id.
89. In re TWA, 322 F.3d at 290.
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Following the case law analysis, the In re TWA court dissected the
language of § 363(f).9 The court determined that it would be
inconsistent to equate "interests" in property with only in rem
interests such as liens because the language of the section specifi-
cally provides for treatment of liens under subsection 363(f)(3).91
That is, if Congress had intended that § 363(f) be limited. to "liens,"
it would not have created a subsection dealing exclusively with
"liens."92 The court found that it was appropriate to view "liens" as
a mere subset of "interests."93
Finally, the In re TWA court embarked on what may only be
described properly as a loose policy discussion under the subject
heading "Other Considerations."94 In that section, the court stated
rather emphatically that "[e]ven were we to conclude that the claims
at issue are not interests in property, the priority scheme of the
Bankruptcy Code supports the transfer of TWA's assets free and
clear of the claims."95 Essentially, the court concluded that if the
successor liability claims were allowed to proceed against American
Airlines, the statutory scheme of prioritizing creditors' interests
under the Bankruptcy Code would be disrupted. That is, allowing an
unsecured claimant to proceed against the assets of a purchaser
would effectively elevate the status of a general unsecured creditor
over that held by secured creditors.96 Following a § 363(f) sale, such
secured creditors would be able to assert their interests only against
the sale proceeds and the debtor's remaining estate.97 The court
specifically mentioned the fact that American Airlines was the only
qualified bidder on TWA's bankruptcy assets and stated that "[t]he
arguments advanced by appellants [did] not seem to account
adequately for [this] fact."9 From the language at the end of the
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing WBQ P'Ship v. Va. Dep't of Med. Assistance Servs: (In re WBQ P'ship), 189
B.R. 97, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995)).
93. Id. Curiously, the court failed to comment on the controversy regarding whether
"claims" are also a subset of "interests."
94. Id. at 291.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 292.
97.Id.
98. Id. at 293.
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opinion, it seems that the court's willingness to balance the equities
of the case ultimately drove the final decision,99 irrespective of
statutory or case law authority:
Given the strong likelihood of a liquidation absent the asset sale
to American ... we agree with the Bankruptcy Court that a sale
of the assets of TWA at the expense of preserving successor
liability claims was necessary in order to preserve some 20,000
jobs ... and to provide funding for employee-related liabilities,
including retirement benefits.'"
This language clearly indicates that the court was balancing the
equities in the case, but the court failed to make an explicit appeal
to its equitable powers, thereby detracting from the case's value as
precedent for the formulation of future bankruptcy court decisions.
IV. THE MISSING LINK: AN APPEAL TO EQUITABLE POWERS
What is missing from the Third Circuit's opinion is any specific
discussion that might provide a firm grounding in the Bankruptcy
Code for such a balancing of the case's equitable considerations.
This Note contends that the result in the case was a good one
overall. 10 1 Certainly, the long-term macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic effects of a major airline's bankruptcy cannot be overempha-
sized and, in light of the generally dismal economic conditions in the
U.S. economy at the time of the In re TWA decision, 102 the result in
the case is unsurprising. What is surprising, however, is the
apparent failure of the court to base what seems to be the driving
rationale behind its decision-the overarching public policy
concerns-on anything more than smoke and mirrors. Indeed, in a
recent case, In re Eveleth Mines LLC,1' the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota scathingly derided the
99. See Thomas D. Goldberg, New Decisions Protecting Purchasers of Assets Under § 363
of the Bankruptcy Code, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30 (May 2003) (describing the In re TWA
decision as having a "results-oriented undertone").
100. In re TWA, 322 F.3d at 293.
101. See also Goldberg, supra note 99, at 30 (noting that the results of In re TWA are "hard
to argue with").
102. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
103. 312 B.R. 634 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2004).
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line of reasoning adopted by the Third Circuit in In re TWA as being
"built on an amorphously inclusive rationalization; it posits a loose
sort of 'but-for' causality that is thrown up to identify the straw-
built 'interest' that then is vanquished."1 °4
To at least some degree, this criticism is well deserved. The In re
TWA court's inclusion of the EEOC and travel voucher "claims"
within the scope of § 363(f)'s "interest" seems strained.0 5 If all that
is required of an item for it to be within the purview of § 363(f)'s
meaning of "interest" is that it find some connection to the assets of
the debtor, no matter how attenuated, then little would be beyond
the scope of that section. If the debtor engaged any assets in its
business operations, then it might be said that the "claim" or
"interest" arose from those assets. If Congress had intended § 363(f)
to provide utterly limitless power, we might have expected the
language of that section to include a more exhaustive list of terms.
For example, Congress could have drafted the language of § 363(f)
in a manner that would allow for pre-plan asset sales to occur "free
and clear of all interests, claims, and liens, both known and un-
known."
If it were not for the final portion of the opinion in which the court
engaged in a non-explicit balancing of the equities-the "Other
Considerations" section' ° 6-we might well conclude that the In re
TWA court saw no end to the definition of "interest" as provided by
the language of § 363(f). In light of the "Other Considerations"
section, however, it becomes apparent that the In re TWA court
stopped somewhere short of an outright statement that § 363(f)'s
language alone provides the authority for bankruptcy courts to
extinguish "interests" in an infinitely expansive sense of that term.
Actually, the court could not have concluded that § 363(f) was truly
limitless without overturning its own decision in Folger,107 a case
cited approvingly for its "arising from" standard for determining
what constitutes an "interest."'0 8 Analysis of In re TWA, therefore,
104. Id. at 654.
105. See supra Part II (suggesting that plain language would not include the "claims" of
unsecured creditors, such as tort claimants).
106. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Knox-Schillinger (In re TWA, Inc.), 322
F.3d at 283, 291-93 (3d Cir. 2003).
107. Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2000).
108. In re TWA, 322 F.3d at 289-90 (citing Folger, 209 F.3d at 259); see also 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 72, 363.06[11].
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reveals that it remains unclear what, if not the plain language of §
363(f), gave the bankruptcy court the authority to sever the EEOC
and travel voucher claims from the assets of TWA upon their sale to
American Airlines and further, whether the court's action is
defensible as a function of the overall goals of the Bankruptcy Code.
The In re TWA court's decision is defensible, but only when it is
grounded within an honest discussion of the bankruptcy court's
equitable powers. Furthermore, enough equitable powers already
exist within the Code and are vested in bankruptcy courts generally
to such an extent that the court in In re TWA could have reached its
decision through § 363(f), at least when that section is coupled with
§ 105(a)'s grant of equitable powers.' °9
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code reads as follows:
(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by
a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from,
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination
necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or
rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.110
Courts, scholars, and practitioners all greet the language of § 105(a)
with some reservation because the breadth of power granted to
bankruptcy courts by the section is not entirely clear."1 Bankruptcy
109. See 11 U.S.C § 105(a) (2000). This Note does not suggest that the result in In re TWA
could have been reached through the operation of § 105(a) alone. The use of § 105(a) to
accomplish goals not addressed elsewhere within the Code or not grounded in a specific Code
provision has been widely, and deservedly, criticized. See infra note 111. See also Norwest
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1988) (stating that the equitable powers
of bankruptcy courts must be grounded in specific code sections). But see Fairchild Aircraft
Inc. v. Campbell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 933 & 933 n.28 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1995) (stating that § 105 may be utilized to enjoin successor liability claims but cannot
bind future claimants who do not yet hold "claims" and are not part of the plan or sale
process), vacated, 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998). This Note merely suggests that the
presence of § 105(a) illustrates the existence of equitable powers as a supplement to other
Code provisions and encourages courts to discuss candidly the use of such powers in their
interpretations of the plain language of § 363(f).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
111. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
15th ed., rev. 2005) (noting that there are two competing "schools of thought regarding the
breadth of section 105": an expansive view of the section, which argues that the section exists
to plug any gaps in the Bankruptcy Code's statutory scheme, and a restrictive view, which
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courts have been criticized for acting solely upon the powers granted
by § 105(a) when they use that section to reach matters that
perhaps would be otherwise beyond the scope of the Bankruptcy
Code.'12
Widespread criticism, however, does not render the language of
§ 105(a) meaningless. Rather, the language's inclusion within the
Bankruptcy Code should serve as a reminder that, ultimately,
bankruptcy courts are equitable in nature' 13 and that all of the
Code's provisions are subject to a balancing of the equities in any
case. It may be conceded that § 105(a) provides no affirmative grant
of authority beyond that which is already granted by the Code's
other provisions, but if the language of § 105(a) is to have any
meaning at all, and particularly to critics of its widespread inde-
pendent use, it must be that the section provides latitude to courts
in their interpretation of a Bankruptcy Code that must be flexible
from a purely pragmatic standpoint.1' 4 This notion seems particu-
larly apposite in cases involving the interpretation controversy of §
363(f).
argues that there are limits to the use of § 105).
[I]t should be universally recognized that the power granted to the bankruptcy
courts under section 105 is not boundless and should not be employed as a
panacea for all ills confronted in the bankruptcy case. Section 105 does not allow
the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates of other sections of the
Bankruptcy Code or mandates of other state and federal statutes.
Id.; see also GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 405, 415
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Section 105 is not without limits. It does not permit the court to
ignore, supersede, suspend or even misconstrue the statute itself or the rules.") (quoting 2
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra, 105.02).
112. See United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[Section 105] does
not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise
unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity."); In re
Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) ("As a general rule ... the
equitable powers of bankruptcy courts must be exercised within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code. Thus, section 105(a) cannot be used to authorize any relief that is
prohibited by another provision of the Code."); Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of
the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1329, 1361-69
(1993).
113. See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) ("[B]ankruptcy courts ... are courts
of equity and 'apply the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence."' quoting Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939))); United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990).
114. The entire bankruptcy process is essentially a compromise in that, in most cases, it
seeks to satisfy the claims of numerous creditors within a finite asset pool.
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It is also worthwhile to consider that § 363(f) originally arose from
general equitable doctrine. A review of case law illustrates that as
a matter of statute or under general equitable principles, the
remedy afforded by § 363(f) has been a part of U.S. bankruptcy law
for more than a century.115 Those readers who are troubled by this
Note's recommendation that courts use equitable powers to expand
and contract the meaning of "interest" in judicial interpretations of
§ 363(f) may find solace in the equity pedigree that marked that
section's ancestors at common law. It would be difficult to contend
broadly that § 363(f) lost its equitable character upon codification
into its modern statutory form.
Most importantly, this Note proposes that bankruptcy courts can
rightly consider "claims" in evaluating what should be stripped from
bankruptcy assets in a free and clear sale even though § 363(f)'s
language alone does not provide for such consideration.1 ' Consider-
ation of "claims" is appropriate when conducted through the use of
general equitable considerations inherent in all portions of the
Bankruptcy Code. Courts should expressly evaluate the equities of
each case, and if circumstances compel, as they did in In re TWA," 7
the court should permit the sale of assets free of such "claims" and
"interests" to facilitate a critical transaction that otherwise might
not transpire, "8 or at best, only transpire at a deep discount to
account for risks of potential successor liability."9 Such a discount
could inure to the detriment of the debtor, secured creditors, and the
overall prioritization scheme of the Code as a whole, 2 ' while
benefiting only a select few unsecured claimants. Conversely, if the
interests of the claimants are of greater weight than the risk of a
"market chilling" effect caused by the specter of successor liability,
the court could refuse to grant the free and clear sale, or condition
115. See, e.g., Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 227-29 (1931); Ray v. Norseworthy,
90 U.S. 128, (23 Wall) 134-35 (1874); In re Waterloo Organ Co., 118 F. 904, 906 (W.D.N.Y.
1902).
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000); supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
117. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Knox-Schillinger (In re TWA, Inc.), 322
F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003); see supra Part III.
118. But see Goldberg, supra note 99, at 30 (contending that it is probable that American
Airlines would have consummated the transaction regardless of whether the claims at issue
could be severed under the § 363(f) sales process).
119. See Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 13, at 358-59.
120. Id.
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the sale upon a concession from the purchaser of the debtor's assets
that successor liability claims are in no way precluded by operation
of the court's sale order.
If a court were to follow the promoted approach, it would not
necessarily be taking a different path than the In re TWA court, but
it would at least be engaging in a candid and explicit equitable
balancing process rather than the seemingly covert methodology
employed by the Third Circuit in In re TWA. 2' The law may never
offer certainty in all cases, but it should, at the very least, be honest
as to the means by which it reaches its conclusions.
CONCLUSION
"Free and clear" asset sales under § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code
provide a valuable means for debtors to raise funds quickly to
satisfy their financial obligations. The use of § 363(f) to strip assets
of "liens" is well accepted,122 but whether "claims" can be stripped
under that section is quite contested.'23 The word "interest" is not
defined by the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy courts have varied
as to whether they interpret "interests" as used in § 363(f) to include
"claims."'24 Critics of the expansive interpretation of "interests"
argue that such an interpretation does violence to the plain
language of § 363(f) and injures unsecured claimants as a result.'
Proponents of the expansive interpretation contend that to allow
successor liability claims to proceed against the asset purchaser
effectively allows for the interests of unsecured claimants to be
inappropriately elevated above those of secured creditors in
contravention of the overall prioritization scheme envisioned by the
Bankruptcy Code,' 26 and in some cases, may amount to an uncom-
pensated taking in violation of the Constitution.'27
The Third Circuit decided In re TWA in 2003. In affirming the
bankruptcy court and the district court, the Third Circuit settled on
121. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3); supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Kuney, supra note 12.
126. See, e.g., Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 13.
127. Id. at 356-64.
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a broad interpretation of "interest" under § 363(f) that allowed
TWA's asset sale to American Airlines to proceed "free and clear" of
employee discrimination claims and liabilities for travel vouchers
issued to a plaintiff class in settlement of an earlier lawsuit. 2 ' A
reading of the In re TWA opinion reveals that the case was decided
less on a purely statutory basis of § 363(f) than on a virtually covert
balancing of the equitable circumstances present in the case.129
Although this Note contends that the result reached by the Third
Circuit in In re TWA ultimately was correct, the Note argues that
the court's reasoning would have had greater force if the court had
expressly discussed its authority to resort to general principles of
equity in deciding bankruptcy cases. Section 105(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides equitable powers to bankruptcy courts. This
Note concedes that, as a means to accomplish results beyond the
scope of other provisions within the Bankruptcy Code, § 105(a)
would be used incorrectly. 3 ° Section 105(a) may prove useful,
however, as a means to provide additional latitude in cases
involving "claims" of unsecured parties and "free and clear" asset
sales pursuant to § 363(f). 131
Matthew T. Gunlock*
128. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Knox-Schillinger (In re TWA, Inc.), 322
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129. See id. at 291-93; supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
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